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Do Minimum Wages Improve Early Life Health? Evidence from 
Developing Countries 
   
Abstract: The impact of legislated minimum wages on the early-life health of children 
living in low and middle-income countries has not been examined. For our analyses, we 
used data from the Demographic and Household Surveys (DHS) from 57 countries 
conducted between 1999 and 2013. Our analyses focus on height-for-age z scores 
(HAZ) for children under 5 years of age who were surveyed as part of the DHS. To 
identify the causal effect of minimum wages, we utilized plausibly exogenous variation 
in the legislated minimum wages during each child's year of birth, the identifying 
assumption being that mothers do not time their births around changes in the minimum 
wage.  As a sensitivity exercise, we also made within family comparisons (mother fixed 
effect models). Our final analysis on 49 countries reveal that a 1 % increase in minimum 
wages was associated with 0.1 % (95% CI= -0.2, 0) decrease in HAZ scores. Adverse 
effects of an increase in the minimum wage were observed among girls and for children 
of fathers who were less than 35 years old, mothers aged 20-29, parents who were 
married, parents who were less educated, and parents involved in manual work. We 
also explored heterogeneity by region and GDP per capita at baseline (1999). Adverse 
effects were concentrated in lower-income countries and were most pronounced in 
South Asia. By contrast, increases in the minimum wage improved children’s HAZ in 
Latin America, and among children of parents working in a skilled sector. Our findings 
are inconsistent with the hypothesis that increases in the minimum wage unconditionally 
improve child health in lower-income countries, and highlight heterogeneity in the 
impact of minimum wages around the globe. Future work should involve country and 
occupation specific studies which can explore not only different outcomes such as infant 
mortality rates, but also explore the role of parental investments in shaping these 
effects.  
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1 Introduction  
Early life environmental conditions play a critical role in shaping well-being over the life-
course. Most studies have treated extreme and less commonly observed shocks, such 
as famines, as natural experiments to study the causal impact of early life conditions 
(Almond, and Currie 2011). Recently, a small literature has been exploring the impact of 
policies targeting social determinants, including cash or educational interventions, on 
early life health in both developing and developed countries (Bhutta et al. 2008; Engle et 
al. 2011; Owusu-Addo and Cross 2014). Cash transfers have received much attention 
and have been shown to improve health services utilization, with mixed effects on early 
life health outcomes (Fiszbein et al. 2009).  However, little attention is paid to the 
potential of labor market institutions, specifically income protection legislation, in 
shaping opportunities for investing in early life health and the subsequent impact on 
early life health outcomes. Given this, we pose the following question: Do minimum 
wages improve early life health?  
To the extent that minimum wages influence parental wage income, they might affect 
parental investments in child health. For example, if wages were to increase, families 
might be more likely to avail themselves of health services and engage in other salutary 
behaviors which may be particularly effective around the time of birth. However, parents 
may also be more likely to spend additional time in the labor market at the expense of 
care-giving activities. The time around birth is widely understood to be a critical period in 
shaping child nutrition and stunting levels; therefore, changes in parental economic 
conditions in the pre- and post-natal periods may have particularly large effects on child 
health and nutrition (Bhutta et al. 2008; Engle et al. 2011).  
The large literature on economics of minimum wages finds that minimum wages can 
increase the earnings of low-income workers without causing job losses as wage 
increases improve workers’ productivity, particularly for workers in large firms (Card and 
Krueger, 1994; Levine, 1992). However, theory and empirical findings have also 
suggested that higher minimum wages lead to lower employment (especially for 
workers in smaller firms) as costs of production increase and firms respond by laying off 
workers (Neumark and Wascher 2008).  
The limited but growing literature from developing countries generally finds highly 
heterogeneous effects of minimum wage policies on employment and poverty 
(Betcherman 2012). Studies from Latin America suggest that higher minimum wages 
can lead to increases in wages for workers earning near the minimum wage, although 
those most in need may not benefit (Bhorat et al. 2014). Studies in Sub-Saharan Africa 
find that increases in minimum wages have a small negative impact, or no measurable 
impact on employment (Bhorat et al. 2015). Whereas there is very limited evidence from 
South Asia on minimum wages, generally rigid labor regulations have been found to 
have adverse effects on employment (Djankov and Ramalho 2009; Besley and Burgess 
2004).        
Apart from regional heterogeneity, a second level of heterogeneity is due to economic 
conditions of the country. The same increase in income may have greater effect in 
poorer countries (Ferreira and Schady 2009), however poor countries may also have 
lower compliance to minimum wage laws due to weak enforcement of laws (Bhorat et 
al. 2015) which may make the overall effect of minimum wages on poor countries 
ambiguous.   
A third level of heterogeneity relates to the socio-demographic and economic 
characteristics of workers, including their occupation, age, gender, income, and skill 
level. Most of the research in poor countries find adverse effects of minimum wages on 
employment, particularly among the younger adults and those in their prime working 
ages, as well as those working in manual and less skill-intensive sectors, many of whom 
tend to be disproportionality women (Betcherman 2012; Neumark and Wascher 2008). 
In general, both theory and evidence from the economics of minimum wage literature 
suggest that the mean effects of minimum wages are not a sufficient statistic to 
summarize the distribution of treatment effects of minimum wages. The effects vary 
depending on the level of heterogeneity, and for a given level of heterogeneity, the type 
of sub-group considered.  
Ferreira and Schady (2009) develop a simple conceptual framework, building on the 
insights from Preston (1975) and Deaton (2003), which highlights that an additional 
dollar in a poor and malnourished context may be used to buy more nutritious and 
healthy goods, than in richer and healthier settings, where the same dollar may be 
spent on less essential (even unhealthy) commodities. In our setting, this suggests that 
effects of minimum wages on child nutrition may be greater in regions, such as Sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia, where malnutrition is a bigger problem than in Latin 
America (Black et al. 2008) and in countries which are poorer; households which are 
poorer and whose members work in manual-unskilled sectors may also register 
stronger adverse effects.  Furthermore, to the extent there is gender discrimination, we 
may expect parents to invest less in girls specially when faced with adverse economic 
circumstances (Maccini and Yang 2009; Behrman and Anil Deolalikar 1990).  
Ultimately, whether minimum wage laws lead to improvements or deterioration in child 
health, through changes in parental economic conditions, is an open empirical question. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to explore the causal impact of 
minimum wage laws on early life health in low and middle-income countries (LMICs). 
To identify the effect of minimum wage laws, we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in 
minimum wages during each child's year of birth, the identifying assumption being that 
mothers do not time their births around changes in the minimum wage. Our 
identification strategy uses children born at different times from the same country as 
controls, rather than exclusively relying on comparisons with children born in different 
countries which are more likely to be confounded. We strengthen our identification 
strategy by carrying out a difference-in difference estimation that utilizes not only within 
country cohort variation in exposure to minimum wages (over more than decade), but 
also spatial variation in the intensity of the increases in minimum wages (through cohort 
fixed effects) across countries to control for time varying changes in economic 
conditions across cohorts. As part of our sensitivity analyses, we also utilize mother 
fixed effect models to exploit cohort variation in exposure to different levels of minimum 
wages across biological siblings, allowing us to control for family-level time invariant 
unobservables which may be potentially biasing our results. Furthermore, based on the 
insights of the economics of minimum wage literature, we hypothesize that certain 
subgroups (poor, less skilled, and young for example) will demonstrate stronger effects 
than others (those in the skilled sector, richer countries or regions where malnutrition is 
less of a problem such as Latin America), which helps us generate placebos and infer 
which mechanisms might be at play. 
For our analysis, we merged longitudinal cross-country data on minimum wage levels 
with child-level health data from 57 countries surveyed by the Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS), covering the period between 2000 and 2013. Using height for age z-
scores (HAZ) as a measure of child nutrition, our analysis addresses the following 
questions: First, does exposure of parents to increases in the minimum wage (MW) 
around the time of birth improve child nutrition? Second, do these effects vary by 
parental and child SES, by income level of the country and by the geographical 
regions? Third, what are the potential channels that explain observed effects?  
2 Methods 
Sample 
The minimum wage data for this study comes from the Minimum Wage Policy Database 
constructed by XXX research program in collaboration with XXX. The database consists 
of country-year observations of minimum wage levels, as set by policy between 1999 
and 2013, for 121 LMICs surveyed by the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) 
and/or by UNICEF’s Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) up to 2013. In Appendix 
C we provide more details about our minimum wage data set. 
To estimate the impact of MW on health outcomes, we used the Demographic and 
Health Surveys (DHS) from 57 countries in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas, 
spanning more than a decade between 2000 and 2013. The DHS are nationally 
representative household surveys conducted in LMICs and are designed to collect 
health and sociodemographic information on women of reproductive age (15–49 years), 
men (usually aged 15–54 or 15–59), and children ever born (Corsi et al. 2012).  The 
DHS asks women about their birth history, in addition to their socio-economic 
background, among other topics. Regarding birth history, information about date of birth 
(month and year) and child’s gender is available for all births.  
Our original data set contained 748,320 observations on HAZ scores for children 0-5 
years old alive at the time of interview from 57 countries with survey years ranging from 
2000 to 2013. To ensure that minimum wage effects are identified and estimated on a 
relevant population, we restricted our sample to residents of urban areas, reducing our 
sample to 250,268 observations (64% of sample is rural). We excluded those children 
whose mothers were widowed, divorced or not living with their partner (8% of the 
sample), and those whose parents were both working in agriculture or self-employed. 
Finally, we extracted the subset of children whose mothers were between 14 and 39 
years of age and whose fathers were between 20 and 50 years of age. These 
restrictions led to a sample size of 179,148. After accounting for missing values in 
minimum wage data and parental characteristics, our final sample consisted of 139,824 
children born between 1999 and 2012 in 49 countries. 
Measures 
Our exposure was the latest monthly minimum wage rate in place at the end of every 
calendar year for workers in the formal, non-public sector. For those countries where 
the minimum wage was sector-specific or occupation-specific, the level applicable to the 
manufacturing sector or unskilled workers was recorded. We used PPP conversion and 
inflation factors from the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) to create a 
minimum wage series in PPP constant 2011 US dollars. Appendix table A3 lists the 
original 57 DHS countries in our data set and highlights considerable variation in 
legislated nominal minimum wages over time, across countries and regions 
For children born in the five years prior to the survey and alive at the time of interview, 
the DHS provides anthropometric measures constructed using 2006 WHO child growth 
standards. Our primary outcome was children’s height-for-age anthropometric scores, 
which are widely regarded as an important predictor of long-run health and economic 
well-being (Behrman and Deolalikar 1988; Hodinott et al. 2013a,b; Victora et al. 2008). 
We accounted for potential confounding by individual and household characteristics 
posited to influence the relationship between minimum wages and child height for age 
z-scores. Children’s covariates included gender, age in months, age squared, birth 
order; mother’s covariates included age at birth in months, age at birth squared, year of 
birth dummies, marital status, total children under 5, total number of children born, 
occupation and educational attainment; and father’s covariates consisted of age in 
years at time of survey, occupation, and educational attainment. Parental educational 
attainment was coded as follows:  0 - education; 1- incomplete primary; 2-compete 
primary; 3-incomplete secondary, 4-secondary, and 5- higher education.  To account for 
household SES, we controlled for quintiles of the DHS wealth index, which is based on 
ownership of specific assets (e.g. radio and television), environmental conditions, and 
housing characteristics (e.g., materials used for housing construction and sanitation 
facilities), and constructed using a method developed by Filmer and Pritchett (Filmer 
and Pritchett 2001,1999).  
 
 
3 Empirical Strategy  
The following reduced form equation was used to model the impact of minimum wages 
on child health: 
𝑌!"#$   = 𝛼 + 𝛽!  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑊!" + 𝛽!𝑋!"#$   + 𝑔(𝑐, 𝑡)+ 𝑈!"#$ ,      (1)     
where 𝑌!"#$  is the outcome of interest for child i born in year t belonging to mother m in 
country c. 𝛽! is the parameter of interest as it measures the impact of a 1 % increase in 
constant, PPP-adjusted minimum wages in a given country c at time t (for cohort t). 
Data on MW was matched to the year of birth of each child, so that cohort variation in 
exposure to MW is exploited for identification of causal effects.     
To deal with factors that may confound the relation between minimum wages and child 
health, we flexibly controlled for 𝑋!"#$, which is a vector containing child, parental, and 
household characteristics. 
Our identification strategy exploits arguably exogenous timing of changes in minimum 
wages with the timing of births. This suggests that our control group is not a different 
country, but children within the same country at different times. We complement our 
identification strategy with controls for g(c,t)—country fixed effects and time trends 
(child’s year of birth fixed effects). Country fixed effects control for any time invariant 
differences between countries that may bias the effects of MW, whereas the time trends 
control for unobservable changes in economic conditions over time.   
In stratified models, we also examined heterogeneous effects of MW by child gender, 
child age, parental age, maternal marital status, and economic background of the 
household (wealth quintiles, parental education and employment), as well as the region 
and level of economic development of the country at baseline.  
Last, we explored the sensitivity of our results to unobserved family heterogeneity by 
comparing biological siblings through a mother fixed effects model. This model allows 
us to control for any unobservable factors common between siblings, which may bias 
our estimates of 𝛽!  in model (1). As we are using a select sample of urban families 
working in the formal sector, we did not use DHS country weights in our analyses. 
4 Results 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the key variables used in our analyses. The mean 
HAZ scores were negative, suggesting that the average country in our sample has an 
undernourished sample of children (relative to WHO standards) aged zero to five. The 
mean value of our minimum wage exposure was US $278 per month, however there 
was significant variation in minimum wage values as reflected in the standard deviation 
of US $149 and its wide range of US $7 per month to US $633 per month.   
Table 2A shows the β1 estimates from equation (1). For the purpose of this paper, we 
will be reporting effects of a 1 % increase in real minimum wages (given by  ~ β1 /100). 
To be consistent in the discussion of our estimates, we have rounded our estimates to 
the nearest 3 decimal places. We find that a 1 % increase in minimum wages was 
associated with a decrease in HAZ (for children 0-5 years of age) of 0.001 standard 
deviations (95% CI= -0.002, 0.000). Given the mean HAZ of ~-1 SD, a -0.001 SD effect 
translates into a -0.1% (0.001 SD/1 SD) change in HAZ scores or an elasticity of HAZ 
with respect to minimum wages of 0.1. The overall estimate, however, may hide the 
presence of heterogeneous effects by child gender. We found that an increase in the 
minimum wage reduced HAZ for girls by -0.001 SD (95% CI= -0.002, 0.000); as shown 
in Table 2A, the effect was is similar for boys with a wide CI (95% CI= -0.002, 0.001). 
A second level of heterogeneity may be due to parental characteristics. Table 3A shows 
the estimates on children according to whether their mothers were in their prime 
childbearing age (19-29) at the time of birth, as well as whether their fathers (mothers’ 
current partners) were 35 years of age or less at the time of survey. We found that a 1 
% increase in minimum wages reduced HAZ scores by 0.001 for children whose 
mothers were between 19 and 29 years of age, whereas the effects on children whose 
mothers gave birth when they were older than 29 or younger than 19 were smaller. 
Appendix Table A1* shows that the HAZ for children of mothers between ages 19 and 
29 years compared to other mothers were lower by 0.001 SD (95% CI= -0.002, -0.000). 
Similarly, the adverse effects of minimum wage increases were driven by children of 
young fathers—a 1 % increase in minimum wages reduced HAZ scores by 0.001 SD. 
Results in Table 4A reveal that minimum wage laws register adverse effects for mothers 
who are married in particular: - 0.001 SD (95% CI= -0.003, 0.000). As shown in 
Appendix Table A1*, the difference between married and non-married mothers was -
0.001 SD (95% CI= -0.003, 0.000). 
Table 4A also shows heterogeneity across wealth quintiles. For those in the poorest 
quintile, where one might expect the greatest effect of minimum wage laws, a 1 % 
increase in minimum wages decreased the mean HAZ score by 0.004 (95% CI= -0.007, 
-0.000) standard deviations. Appendix Table A1* shows that the estimates for the 
lowest quintile were lower than those registered in the higher quantiles: -0.003 SD (95% 
CI= -0.006, 0.000).  
Table 5A explores heterogeneity by parental education. Results showed adverse effects 
on children across educational levels for both parents, with adverse effects of -0.001 SD 
(95% CI: -0.002, 0.000) among children whose mothers were less educated (those who 
have completed less than secondary schooling). 
A third level of heterogeneity may be related to the level of economic development of 
the country: Table 6A explores effects on “poorer” countries with low levels of GDP per 
capita (below the median GDP per capita in 1999) versus those with relatively higher 
GDP per capita (above the median GDP per capita in the sample). We found that 
adverse effects were primarily driven by low-income countries, where we observed a 
0.002 standard deviation (95% CI: -0.003, -0.000) reduction in mean HAZ scores in 
response to a 1% increase in minimum wages. Appendix Table A2* shows that the 
estimate in the poorest countries was lower than in richer countries: -0.002 SD (95% 
CI= -0.004, 0.000). 
Given that our analyses included countries from very diverse regions of the world, with 
different socio-economic conditions, we explored heterogeneity by region in Table 7A. 
We found that adverse effects were particularly large in South Asian region, where a 1 
% increase in minimum wage levels led to a 0.007 standard deviation (95% CI= -0.011, 
-0.003) decrease in HAZ scores. 
In order to examine potential mechanisms, we next explored if increases in minimum 
wages affected maternal employment status. Table 8 suggests that minimum wages 
negatively affected maternal employment in poorer countries. In Appendix Table A2* we 
explored the impact of this change on children’s HAZ scores. A 1 % increase in 
minimum wages reduced mean HAZ scores by -0.002 SD (95% CI= -0.004, -0.001), 
among children whose mothers from poor countries were not working at the time of 
survey (relative to their counterparts in richer countries). 
We next analyzed whether the sector/occupation of work matters. Table 9A shows that 
children of mothers working in the manual sector were most adversely affected by 
increases in minimum wages. Interestingly, we find positive effects of minimum wage 
increases for children of mothers working in the sales sector. Results from analyses 
stratified by the occupation of fathers (Table 10A) showed a similar story: positive 
effects on child HAZ for fathers working in sales, but adverse effects for fathers working 
in the manual sector. Results from Appendix Table A2* further suggest that the children 
of parents in sales occupations fare better than parents in other occupations, and those 
in manual work are more adversely affected. 
Sensitivity Analyses 
Tables 2B-10B compare changes in HAZ among biological siblings who were exposed 
to changes in minimum wages, by carrying out a mother fixed effects model on families 
with two or more children under 5. The results are robust overall, with effect sizes 
increasing in many cases (more adverse effects). However, we do find some interesting 
differences:  children of less educated mothers and less educated fathers were 
adversely affected; the effects on children of married mothers were attenuated; and 
children in the richest families were also adversely affected. Perhaps the most 
interesting differences are in terms of region: adverse effects were concentrated in 
South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, with positive effects in Latin America. Furthermore, 
Table A6 explores sensitivity of our mother fixed effects to clustering at the country and 
mother levels for a few of our key estimates and found results to be robust. 
We carried out a range of other sensitivity tests. For our full sample and the sample 
from poorest households, we explored lags of 1 and 2 years and a lead of 1 year for the 
year of the MW.  Appendix Table A4* shows some evidence of adverse effects on the 
poorest households in the year prior to birth, but smaller and noisier effects with lag of 2 
years and a lead of 1 year (second year of birth). This provides suggestive evidence of 
the importance of the year of birth as a crucial year in shaping HAZ for children. 
Another concern is that the sample we have chosen for our analysis (those living in 
urban areas who have at least one parent not working in agriculture) may be 
systemically related to certain omitted variables which are correlated with increases in 
minimum wages as well as changes in HAZ. In Table A5* we show little evidence of 
such a selection at play, even if we restrict our sample to South Asia or Latin America 
(where we were finding some of the largest and contrasting effects).  
In Appendix B we list and discuss in greater detail a broad list of potential concerns to 
our identification strategy (e.g. biases due to time varying unobservable, lack of 
compliance of laws, etc.). 
5. Discussion 
This is the first paper, which we are aware of, to analyze the causal relation between 
minimum wages and early life health of children in low and middle-income countries. 
We exploit plausibly exogenous variation in minimum wages with respect to timing of 
births of children born to parents who were affected by these laws. We merged data on 
minimum wage levels for 57 countries to data on height-for-age (HAZ) scores for 
children under 5 available from DHS surveys between 1999 and 2013.  Overall, a 1 % 
increase in minimum wages led to a 0.001 standard deviation decrease in HAZ scores 
(95% CI= -0.002, 0.000). Given that the mean HAZ score is -1 SD, a 1% increase in 
minimum wages is associated with 0.1% decrease in HAZ scores. The effect sizes rise 
to about 0.8% decrease in HAZ for a 1% increase in minimum wages when only South 
Asia is studied (mother fixed effects model). These estimates correspond to elasticities 
of 0.1 to 0.8, which are remarkably similar in magnitude to elasticities from the literature 
exploring the impact of minimum wages on employment (Neumark and Wascher 2008). 
 
Overall our estimates cannot reject the null of no effects of minimum wages on child 
HAZ. This is consistent with findings from the economics of minimum wage literature, 
which often finds that minimum wages cannot reject the null of no effects on 
employment and income (Betcherman 2012; Neumark and Wascher 2008). However, 
the global intent to treat estimate may be biased downwards for various reasons: a lack 
of policy compliance, the very local nature of the effects of minimum wage laws on 
certain sub-populations, and counteracting effects in different world regions. We find 
particularly large and adverse effects in the poorest countries and in the South Asian 
region. These findings echo results from studies that have highlighted the adverse 
impacts of labor market regulation in India (Djankov and Ramalho 2009; Besley and 
Burgess 2004).  We also find that increases in the minimum wage increased rates of 
maternal unemployment. The fact that we do not find adverse effects of minimum 
wages on HAZ scores or on maternal employment in richer countries further suggests 
that unemployment may be a relevant mechanism through which adverse health effects 
are materialized. 
The literature on minimum wage effects on employment also suggests that the most 
severe effects are to be expected on those who are in their prime ages and are less 
skilled (Betcherman 2012). Consistent with this, we find that the adverse effects of 
minimum wage laws are concentrated among children of parents in their prime age  and 
families in the lowest wealth quintile. And among those who work, the children of those 
working in less skilled occupations (manual work) experienced the most adverse 
effects.  
Interestingly, we find that increases in minimum wage laws also benefit some sub-
groups. Those residing in Latin America and those working in sales (a relatively more 
skilled occupation) actually register positive effects. This may be partly due to 
malnutrition being a much less serve issue in Latin America but also because minimum 
wages have been found to have positive effects on wages and employment. Studies on 
Latin America have documented “lighthouse effects” whereby the informal sector 
benefits from increased employment and higher wages as the formal sector wage levels 
serve as reference for these sectors (Maloney and Mendez 2004).  
Our results question the hypothesis that increases in minimum wages improve child 
health for the marginalized. Although there is evidence of positive effects for those 
working in a more skilled sector and for those born in Latin America, the overall 
estimates are suggestive of adverse effects on a wide range of less well-off sub-groups 
which are often of interest to policy makers.  
Our analysis is not without limitations.  First, we do not have data on parental wages, so 
we could not limit our analyses to parents who earned a wage likely to have been 
impacted by changes in minimum wages. As a result, we limited our analyses to 
subgroups most likely to have been affected. To the extent that many among our 
treatment group are not directly affected by minimum wages and to the extent that there 
may be weak compliance to minimum wage legislation even within relevant sub-groups, 
our estimates are biased downwards. Second, our results suggest that it is changes in 
minimum wages around birth that mattered most for a child’s height for age in their first 
five years of life. However, with annual minimum wage data, it was not possible to 
accurately capture the relative importance of conditions in narrow windows of exposure. 
This creates measurement error in our treatment variable which may be biasing our 
estimates downwards. Third, because we estimated effects retrospectively up to five 
years after birth, we were not able to explore effects on employment status and 
utilization of health services before, during, and immediately after the birth of sampled 
children. Consequently, we are not able to comprehensively analyze the pathways 
through which minimum wage shocks impact child height for age z scores. Fourth, we 
did not formally carry out a test of multiple hypotheses given the large number of sub-
groups analyzed. However, we may not have been adequately powered to examine 
effects within these subgroups and correcting for multiple testing may have further 
accentuated this problem. To indirectly deal with this, in our appendix, we provided an 
alternate way of assessing heterogeneity with smaller sub-groups (binary terms) and we 
still found similar patterns. Nevertheless, our results indicate that shocks to aggregate 
wages, through minimum wage changes, can have important and heterogeneous 
consequences for an important marker of early child nutrition, which is predictive of later 
life changes in health and economic well-being. 
Given that this topic has not been studied much before, we think of this paper as 
scratching the surface on an important, yet under-researched topic. There is a need for 
country and occupation specific studies which can explore not only different outcomes 
such as infant mortality rates, but also explore the role of parental investments in 
shaping these effects.  
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TABLES 
 
 Table 1: Sample Characteristics for 57 LMIC Countries in the Demographic and Health Surveys 1999-2012 
 Total Mean SD Min Max 
Height-for-age z scores 179148 -0.97 1.55 -6 6 
Minimum wages (PPP, 
constant 2011 USD) 
153339 278.05 148.62 7.2 632.91 
Log minimum wages 153339 5.44 0.71 1.97 6.45 
Log GDP per capita (PPP, 
constant 2011 USD) 
179148 8.25 0.85 6.09 9.81 
Log GDP per capita in 1999 177142 8.08 0.84 5.98 9.81 
Child's year of  birth 179148 2005.2 3.58 1999 2012 
Child's age (in months) 179148 27.94 16.99 0 59 
Male Child 179148 0.51 0.5 0 1 
Mother employed 170802 0.5 0.5 0 1 
Mother's age at child birth 
(in years) 
179148 25.8 5.56 14 39 
Mother's year of birth 179148 1979.4 6.47 1960 1998 
Wealth Index 179148 3.72 1.23 1 5 
Children under age 5  179148 1.79 0.96 1 14 
Total children born 179148 2.78 1.75 1 17 
Mother married 179148 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Mother's educational 
attainment 
177079 2.63 1.64 0 5 
Tables (NO AUTHOR DETAILS)
  2 
Mother works in agriculture 179148 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Father's age (in years) 169133 33.74 6.74 20 50 
Father works in agriculture 179148 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Father's educational 
attainment 
164133 2.87 1.58 0 5 
Notes: Sample is restricted to those residing in urban areas and excludes those children whose parents are both working in 
agriculture or are self-employed. Mother's age at birth is restricted to be between 14 and 39, father's age is restricted to 
between 20 and 50
  3 
 
TABLE 2A: Minimum Wage Effects on HAZ by Child Gender (Country Fixed Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Overall Female Male 
VARIABLES HAZ HAZ HAZ 
    
Log MW -0.086 -0.092* -0.077 
 (-0.206, 0.034) (-0.191, 0.006) (-0.248, 0.093) 
    
Observations 139,824 68,693 71,131 
R-squared 0.151 0.159 0.145 
Notes: Robust 95% CI in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
TABLE 2B: Minimum Wage Effects on HAZ by Child Gender (Mother Fixed Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Overall Female Male 
VARIABLES HAZ HAZ HAZ 
    
Log MW -0.078 -0.112 -0.049 
 (-0.206, 0.050) (-0.498, 0.275) (-0.381, 0.283) 
    
Observations 76,769 37,901 38,868 
R-squared 0.809 0.902 0.906 
Notes: Robust 95% CI in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  4 
TABLE 3A: Minimum Wage Effects on HAZ by Parental Age (Country Fixed Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Prime Aged 
Mothers 
Other Mothers Younger Father Older Father 
VARIABLES HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ 
     
Log MW -0.126* -0.0392 -0.0986 -0.0637 
 (-0.254, 0.003) (-0.150, 0.072) (-0.231, 0.034) (-0.180, 0.053) 
     
Observations 73,160 66,664 89,937 49,887 
R-squared 0.147 0.158 0.158 0.141 
Notes: Robust 95% CI in parenthesis.*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. Prime aged are 
those mothers who were 19-29 at the time of birth. Young fathers are 35 or less at the 
time of survey. 
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TABLE 3B: Minimum Wage Effects on HAZ by Parental Age (Mother Fixed Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Prime Aged 
Mothers 
Other Mothers Younger Father Older Father 
VARIABLES HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ 
     
Log MW -0.165* 0.0914 -0.133* 0.0231 
 (-0.350, 0.020) (-0.133, 0.316) (-0.286, 0.021) (-0.210, 0.256) 
     
Observations 42,665 34,104 49,292 27,477 
R-squared 0.818 0.841 0.804 0.818 
Notes: Robust 95% CI in parenthesis.*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. Prime aged are 
those mothers who were 19-29 at the time of birth. Young fathers are 35 or less at the 
time of survey. 
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TABLE 4A: Minimum Wage Effects on HAZ by SES (Country Fixed Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Married Single Cohabitating Poorest Poor Middle Rich Richest 
VARIABLES HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ 
         
Log MW -0.128* -0.005 -0.013 -0.353** -0.081 -0.012 -0.034 -0.124 
 (-0.272, 
0.017) 
(-0.128, 
0.119) 
(-0.143, 
0.117) 
(-0.694,   
 -0.013) 
(-0.252,  
0.090) 
(-0.253, 
0.229) 
(-0.164, 
0.0962) 
(-0.276, 
0.028) 
Observations 94,383 8,793 45,441 8,671 18,333 29,093 36,453 47,274 
R-squared 0.158 0.134 0.136 0.199 0.188 0.158 0.157 0.124 
Notes: Robust 95% CI in parenthesis.*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. First three columns show effects by marital status for 
mothers. Next five columns show effects by household wealth quintiles. 
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TABLE 4B: Minimum Wage Effects on HAZ by SES (Mother Fixed Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Married Single Cohabitating Poorest Poor Middle Rich Richest 
VARIABLES HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ 
         
Log MW -0.096 0.688 -0.055 -0.445** 0.024 0.011 -0.033 -0.193* 
 (-0.241, 
0.050) 
(-1.524, 
2.899) 
(-0.331,  
0.222) 
(-0.887, 
-0.004) 
(-0.413 - 
0.460) 
(-0.279, 
 0.301) 
(-0.265 - 
0.199) 
(-0.422, 
0.037) 
Observations 54,832 3,748 21,937 6,034 10,483 15,468 19,636 25,148 
R-squared 0.810 0.925 0.812 0.787 0.805 0.804 0.809 0.817 
Notes: Robust 95% CI in parenthesis.*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. First three columns show effects by marital status for 
mothers. Next five columns show effects by household wealth quintiles. 
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TABLE 5A: Minimum Wage Effects on HAZ by Parental Education (Country Fixed 
Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Less Educated 
Mothers 
More Educated 
Mothers 
Less Educated 
Fathers 
More Educated 
Fathers 
VARIABLES HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ 
     
Log MW -0.082 -0.081 -0.076 -0.110 
 (-0.189, 0.025) (-0.270, 0.109) (-0.196, 0.045) (-0.250, 0.030) 
     
Observations 93,746 44,054 89,760 45,860 
R-squared 0.150 0.078 0.154 0.109 
Notes: Robust 95% CI in parenthesis.*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1.Less Educated are 
those who have completed less than secondary schooling. 
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TABLE 5B: Minimum Wage Effects on HAZ by Parental Education (Mother Fixed 
Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Less Educated 
Mothers 
More Educated 
Mothers 
Less Educated 
Fathers 
More Educated 
Fathers 
VARIABLES HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ 
     
Log MW -0.133* 0.172 -0.152* 0.121 
 (-0.279, 0.013) (-0.097, 0.441) (-0.307, 0.002) (-0.114, 0.356) 
     
Observations 56,732 19,211 53,091 21,677 
R-squared 0.805 0.807 0.801 0.823 
Notes: Robust 95% CI in parenthesis.*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1.Less Educated are 
those who have completed less than secondary schooling. 
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Table 6A: Minimum Wage Effects on HAZ by Country's Economic Development 
(Country Fixed Effects) 
 (1) (2) 
 Poorest Countries Richer Countries 
VARIABLES HAZ HAZ 
   
Log MW -0.155** 0.027 
 (-0.294, -0.017) (-0.132, 0.186) 
   
Observations 70,473 69,351 
R-squared 0.145 0.133 
Notes: Robust 95% CI in parenthesis.*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1.Poorest countries are 
those with below median GDP per capita measured at baseline (1999). 
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TABLE 6B: Minimum Wage Effects on HAZ by Country's Economic Development 
(Mother Fixed Effects) 
 (1) (2) 
 Poorest Countries Richer Countries 
VARIABLES HAZ HAZ 
   
Log MW -0.121 -0.000 
 (-0.286, 0.044) (-0.209, 0.208) 
   
Observations 43,718 33,051 
R-squared 0.814 0.798 
Notes: Robust 95% CI in parenthesis.*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1.Poorest countries are 
those with below median GDP per capita measured at baseline (1999). 
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TABLE 7A: Minimum Wage Effects on HAZ by Region (Country Fixed Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Sub-
Saharan 
Latin South Middle 
East  & 
Europe 
& 
MENA & Africa & 
 Africa America Asia North 
Africa 
Central 
Asia 
Asia Asia 
VARIABLES HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ 
        
Log MW -0.058 0.066 -0.676** -2.426 0.053 -0.476** -0.127 
 (-0.183, 
0.067) 
(-0.042,  
0.174) 
(-1.062,  
-0.289) 
(-56.19, 
51.33) 
(-0.220, 
0.327) 
(-0.899, -
0.052) 
(-0.292, 
0.037) 
        
Observations 45,748 57,476 18,854 8,149 8,274 28,326 74,074 
R-squared 0.129 0.143 0.170 0.077 0.110 0.204 0.151 
Notes: Robust 95% CI in parenthesis.*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. MENA: Middle East 
and North Africa; Asia: South Asia and East Asia and Pacific; Africa: MENA and Sub-
Saharan Africa 
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TABLE 7B: Minimum Wage Effects on HAZ by Region (Mother Fixed Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Sub-
Saharan 
Latin South Middle 
East & 
Europe 
& 
MENA & Africa & 
 Africa America Asia North 
Africa 
Central 
Asia 
Asia Asia 
VARIABLES HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ 
        
Log MW -0.273** 0.241** -1.136*** -11.72 0.071 -1.024*** -0.252** 
 (-0.506, 
-0.040) 
(0.009, 
0.474) 
(-1.819, 
 -0.452) 
(-26.69, 
3.248) 
(-0.558, 
0.700) 
(-1.496,  
-0.551) 
(-0.444, 
-0.060) 
        
Observations 30,644 25,574 10,305 5,435 4,128 16,423 47,067 
R-squared 0.818 0.822 0.808 0.723 0.775 0.799 0.810 
Notes: Robust 95% CI in parenthesis.*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. MENA: Middle East 
and North Africa; Asia: South Asia and East Asia and Pacific; Africa: MENA and Sub-
Saharan Africa 
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TABLE 8: Minimum Wage Effects on Mother's Employment (Country Fixed Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Poorest Country Richer Country 
VARIABLES Mother Employed Mother Employed Mother Employed 
    
Log MW -0.005 -0.024* 0.026 
 (-0.033, 0.022) (-0.051, 0.003) (-0.016, 0.067) 
    
Observations 133,542 70,442 63,100 
R-squared 0.192 0.251 0.132 
Notes: Robust 95% CI in parenthesis.*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. Mother's 
employment status is measured at the time of survey. 
. 
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TABLE 9A: Minimum Wage Effects on HAZ by Mother's Occupation (County Fixed 
Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Sales Manual Domestic Clerical 
VARIABLES HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ 
     
Log MW 0.112* -0.286** -0.272 -0.130 
 (-0.020, 0.244) (-0.541, -0.030) (-0.709, 0.165) (-0.599, 0.340) 
     
Observations 25,823 10,191 3,414 3,479 
R-squared 0.123 0.164 0.192 0.110 
Notes: Robust 95% CI in parenthesis.*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. 
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TABLE 9B: Minimum Wage Effects on HAZ by Mother's Occupation (Mother Fixed 
Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Sales Manual Domestic Clerical 
VARIABLES HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ 
     
Log MW 0.167 -0.631*          0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.163, 0.497) (-1.263, 0.000) (-1.041, 1.041) (-1.050, 1.049) 
     
Observations 14,261 5,560 1,743 1,287 
R-squared 0.817 0.824 0.810 0.840 
Notes: Robust 95% CI in parenthesis.*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1 
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TABLE 10A: Minimum Wage Effects on HAZ by Father's Occupation (Country Fixed 
Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Sales Manual Domestic Clerical 
VARIABLES HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ 
     
Log MW 0.163** -0.065 0.058 -0.003 
 (0.026, 0.301) (-0.186, 0.055) (-0.397, 0.512) (-0.265, 0.258) 
     
Observations 19,541 48,244 1,462 5,544 
R-squared 0.148 0.160 0.224 0.156 
Notes: Robust 95% CI in parenthesis.*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. 
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TABLE 10B: Minimum Wage Effects on HAZ by Father's Occupation (Mother Fixed 
Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Sales Manual Domestic Clerical 
VARIABLES HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ 
     
Log MW 0.319* -0.0774 -0.394 -0.395 
 (-0.011, 0.649) (-0.283, 0.128) (-2.251, 1.463) (-1.207, 0.417) 
     
Observations 11,435 27,673 774 2,826 
R-squared 0.815 0.806 0.879 0.801 
Notes: Robust 95% CI in parenthesis.*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. 
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